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generalizations point to different patterns of process and structure in history, but the scope of such generalizations never approaches that of natural scientific laws. Ideal types thus occupy a middle ground between the uniqueness of historical events and the generality of laws. Comparison between ideal types and empirical cases identifies adequate causes and aids understanding of divergent historical developments. Central to this methodological strategy is Weber's conviction that social reality is sufficiently complex as to be unknowable in the absence of theoretical interests that guide construction of one-sided type concepts.
Durkheim no less than Weber acknowledged that social life is complex (h, 1:161) and that "scientific thought . . . could never exhaust reality" (i, 150). While this led Weber to comparative studies using ideal types, it led Durkheim to comparisons that emulated laboratory experiments in natural science. To be a science, Durkheim argues, sociology must transcend a preoccupation with detail and uniqueness. This preoccupation leads to conceptual nominalism and methodological individualism, both of which he rejects as antithetical to a science of society (see Gieryn) . But grandiose generalization is equally unacceptable to Durkheim: it grossly simplifies reality in order to subsume it under a universal law or philosophical verity. A different strategy recognizes that "between the confused multitude of historic societies and the single, but ideal concept of humanity, there are intermediaries, namely, social species" (d, 77; see also e; h, III; i). Comparative analysis presumes the existence of social species, that is, discrete types of societies. The "comparative method would be impossible, if social types did not exist, and it cannot be usefully applied except within a single type" (a, 9; see also h, 1:196, 111:29).
Comparative analysis is central to Durkheim's and Weber's vision of sociology because it provides solutions to one of its constitutive problems: reconciling competing claims of complexity and generality in social research.1 Their solutions use different analytical devices, ideal types and social species, to enable systematic comparison. Yet neither regarded his solution as self-evident. They are embedded in theoretical contexts which have profound methodological implications. Weber's epistemological analysis reconciles complexity and generality by showing that they serve complementary purposes in ideal types. Durkheim reconciles the same set of competing claims in an ontological argument about social species that far surpasses simple assertions about the uniformity or diversity of social organization.
For Weber, generalization pushed to the extreme leads to nomothetic abstractions which, because of their abstractness, offer little help in explaining historical divergence. Durkheim was, of course, not opposed to the abstractions of scientific laws but to those of philosophy. Yet both regarded comparative research as the via media between complexity and generality that would establish the academic credentials of sociology. But the nature of this middle way, and the goals toward which it led, were different.
This article examines Durkheim's and Weber's comparative strategies and the different theoretical interests which implicate their respective methodologies, statistical and qualitative-historical. Our general argument is that these are antithetical yet complementary strategies of comparison. Both are compatible with goals of explanation and generalization, but they produce different types of explanation with different degrees of abstraction. The two strategies are neither convergent nor congruent in their (1) units of analysis, (2) conception of causality, (3) conception of adequate explanation, and (4) logic of analysis. But as we demonstrate in the last part of this article, methodological features of each strategy can be combined in comparative research designs in complementary ways. Until now, this has been hampered by widespread misunderstanding of the relationship between statistical and qualitative-historical methods of comparison and their respective theoretical bases.
Our discussion of theory and method in comparative research differs in several ways from previous discussions. First, we link statistical and qualitative-historical comparisons to theoretical interests in different types of explanation. Receptivity to this idea broadens understanding of methodological issues and offers an alternative to false contrasts between statistical and qualitative-historical methods that depict the former as explanatory and the latter as descriptive.
Second, we show that the application of correlational methods to cross-societal data presupposes specific theoretical interests. Other theoretical interests lead to different comparative strategies. Statistical methods of comparison, in our view, are not theoretically neutral, nor are qualitative-historical methods a less desirable proxy for them. Other views of comparative research ignore or minimize the differences we discuss: comparative research2 appears as the application of correlational methods to cross-societal data, which poses specific methodological problems of sampling, measurement, interview design, and so forth.
Such a preemptive view of comparison as correlation appears in the suggestion that "Durkheim was the first to seriously use the comparative method correctly in the scientific sense" (Collins, 529). Others have turned to both Durkheim and Weber, but argue that a methodological convergence between them leads in the direction of multivariate analysis (Kapsis; Smelser, b). Still others argue that there are different strategies of comparison, but that qualitative methods which only mimic statistical methods are dictated by the nature of historical data (Skocpol and Sommers; Sommers). Our disagreement with these arguments will become evident.
Finally, our discussion of theory and comparative method clarifies some prevalent misunderstandings about Durkheim and Weber. Of course, theoretical differences between them are well known. Less satisfactory is current understanding of the bearing of these differences on comparative research. Our remarks systematically relate Durkheim's and Weber's comparative methods to their respectively consistent and compelling theoretical rationales.3
We begin by examining these strategies as they emerged in Durkheim's and Weber's work. Then we discuss the status of these strategies in contemporary research. Finally, we consider ways of combining these strategies that take advantage of the unique strengths of each.
Durkheim, Species and System
Durkheim's comparative strategy begins with the idea of social species. Discrete species of societies exist and can be classified objectively, without the aid of subjective theoretical interests, because their attributes are empirically evident. In The Rules of Sociological Method Durkheim states that species attributes are more permanent than mere "historical phases," such as those defined by different economic systems (e.g., craft industry, manufacturing): "A species defines itself by more constant characteristics" (d, 88n; emphasis added) than those of different economic systems. Species are thus types of societies whose attributes are extremely durable over time.
To justify this position, Durkheim uses biological analogies. Species of society exist "for the same reason that there are biological species" (d, 87). Finite combinations of the basic anatomical unit, the cell, differentiate biological species. The social equivalent of this anatomical unit is "the horde" (d, 82; see also c) out of which arise aggregations ranging in complexity from the clan to "polysegmental societies doubly compounded" and so on. The finite number of aggregations establishes the objectivity of species: "the gamut of possible combinations of social segments is finite; most of them will necessarily appear repeatedly; therefore we must conclude that social species exist" (d, 84).4
Although this discussion appears archaic and far-removed from contemporary methodological issues, it contains a number of modern presuppositions. That different species are objectively distinct and finite presupposes that their internal relations are determined by their mode of aggregation, that their attributes emerge from the combination of their component parts. The assumption that empirically distinct species exist due to different modes of aggregation relies on the concept of hierarchical emergence (see Nagel). In all phases of Durkheim's work (c, 363-4; d, xlvii-viii, 102-4; f, 56-60; g, 26), he defends this doctrine which derives from Comte and leads to modern systems theory (see Lenzer) .
This conception of social species is compatible with systemic conceptions of society (e.g. Buckley; Dubin). The doctrine of hierarchical emergence in Durkheim appears today as an axiom of systems theories in soci-ology: relational properties are emergent properties and must be understood holistically. Relations among variables are largely determined by their systemic context (with due allowance for exogenous forces). For this reason, functional explanations are preferred because they are holistic (Battista) and portray relational properties (Ball; Teune) as emergent features of the system in which they are found. 5
Modern systems theory thus reflects Durkheim's stipulation that institutional components of society are necessary effects of its mode of aggregation (cf. Dubin). This is somewhat concealed by his reliance on biological analogies to explicate systemic notions of causality. For example, Durkheim argues that a history of institutions is to a narrative chronology of events as the mode and functioning of an organ is to the everyday life of an individual.6 The point is not that Durkheim used organic analogies, but that he adopted biology's metatheoretical assumptions because he thought that hierarchical emergence, holistic explanation and classification applied to sociology as to biology (d; see Merton, 102).
Permanent Causes and Correlations
Durkheim's assumptions about emergent properties, holism and classification led him (d) to attach great importance to causes that are internal to the objects of analysis, to permanent causes (Ragin, a). This is crucial for his comparative strategy because it implies that "the determining condition of social phenomena is . .. the very fact of association." Durkheim refers to this fact of association as the "social milieu," "internal environment" or "internal constitution" of society in which "the first origins of all social processes of any importance should be sought" (d, 112-3). Properties of the social milieu are permanent causes that act to maintain the life of the system against internal strains and external pressures.7 He writes: it is ... with relation to this same [social] milieu that the utility or ... function of social phenomena must be measured. Among the changes caused by the social milieu, only those serve a purpose which are compatible with the current state of society, since the milieu is the essential condition of collective existence (d, 119).
Examined critically, the milieu appears in Durkheim's work as a theoretical vanishing point, a postulated causal nexus invoked to account for the response of subsystems to internal or external change in the interest of system maintenance (see Zaret, c).
The causal efficacy of the social milieu is the sine qua non of Durkheim's theoretical presuppositions about social research. He argues that "if we reject this type of cause, there are no concomitant conditions on which social phenomena can depend" (d, 117). No emergent properties, no permanent causes, no study of concomitant conditions, no natural sci-ence of society-this train of thought led Durkheim to adopt and defend assumptions associated today with systems theory.
The assumption that permanent causes are theoretically the most significant has explicit methodological implications for comparative research. Because they are permanent, they are attributes of the unit. As attributes, they cannot be removed for experimental purposes. Because they cannot be removed, it is impossible to determine directly, as in some natural sciences, the true effect of any given property. The property is permanent, and truly experimental designs cannot be used to analyze it.
To surmount this problem Durkheim recommends studying concomitant variation as an "indirect experiment" (d, 125; see also h, III). to discover the laws of nature, one need only make a sufficient number of comparisons between the various forms of a given thing. In this way the constant, unchanging relations expressed in the law are distinguished from those that are merely ephemeral and accidental (e, 511).
The presumed correspondence between observed correlations and permanent causes underlies Durkheim's confidence in his empirical findings. The validity of these findings rests not merely on his application of correlational methods to appropriate data, but, more importantly, on sev-eral theoretical assumptions that attach special importance to observed correlations. Statistical strategies of comparison generally begin with specification of observational units, which are conceived as a population from which the investigator must sample. Investigators assume that their units are autonomous and constitute independent observations. Patterns of relations among variables can then be treated as emergent features of the units that reflect permanent causes. Seldom is all this stated. Instead, these considerations are implicitly invoked in references to systemic qualities of the units (see Zelditch) .
Durkheim and Contemporary
There are, then, three reasons why some comparativists refer to units as systems. First, such references provide a crucial link between explicit strictures on methodology and vaguer, unarticulated assumptions about emergence, permanent causes and naturalistic doctrines of social scientific knowledge. Second, cross-societal research is thought to be re-quisite for analyzing systemic properties. "Only cross-systemic research can elucidate systemic effects" (Frey, 181). At somewhat greater length, others explain that "every complex social unit . .. is an entity in its own right, is a context for its constituent elements" (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 184; see also Rokkan; Scheuch). Third, some sociologists and political scientists argue that comparability of units is determined by their systemic nature (Almond and Powell; Czudnowski; Parsons). This is because the term system denotes both boundary-maintenance and permanent causality. Indeed, virtually anything can be compared in this research strategy if observational units can be described as systems. Equating units with systems not only addresses the issue of comparability, but also invokes a specific comparative strategy.
2. The assumption that units are discrete systems leads directly to an interest in permanent causes. Recall Durkheim's argument that social causes emanate from the internal milieu of society. This implies that causes are attributes of units. Smelser notes that "the unit of analysis should be causally relevant to the phenomena being studied" (b, 173). Hopkins and Wallerstein's comment, cited above, also argues that social causes emanate from the constitution of the unit. In more recent work, Wallerstein continues to advance this position with respect to the world system, a unit whose properties determine the development of its components, nationstates.
Consistent with this position, statistical strategies of comparison proceed from selection of units to delineation of variables (see Przeworski and Teune). These variables are treated as attributes, some of which are causally prior to others. Relationships between these variables are thought to reflect systemic relationships-permanent causes-that hold across all members of the population of units.
3. Study of permanent causes entails concomitant variation as an appropriate logic of analysis with its bias toward "many comparisons-the more the better-in order to establish control for extraneous variation" (Schoenburg, 1). "Extraneous" in reference to this comparative strategy refers to contextual factors such as cultural diffusion and other contingencies associated with historical processes. These factors stand in the way of ascertaining permanent causes, and they must be controlled, averaged out in the error vector or ignored.9 Explanations referring to contextual factors are "not a plausible alternative to functional correlation" (Zelditch, 283; see also Etzioni and DuBow; Gurr and Ruttenberg; Marsh) because they refer to "accidental" and not "essential" features of social units (Elder, 216; see also Andreski; Gillespie; Grimshaw).
The logic of analysis used in comparative study of permanent causes minimizes the role of non-systemic causes associated with historical contexts and contingencies. This is evident in methodological commentaries. We suggest that the systemic presuppositions of a statistical strategy of comparison require this neglect. It is necessary to examine a large number of cases to ensure that permanent causes are distinguished from historical contingencies. Comparability also requires conceptualization of unit attributes at high levels of abstraction in order to obtain "functional equivalence of items" across societies (Verba, a, 314; see also Almond and Verba; Elder). At best, the historical character of populations in statistical strategies of comparison is taken into account in specifications about the scope conditions of variable relations (see Nowak).
More generally, "all purpose categories" (Zelditch, 275) characterize variables that represent unit attributes in this comparative strategy. Where contextual factors seem important, researchers are encouraged to transform them into variables by reconceptualizing them at higher levels of generality (Almond and Verba; Grimshaw; Hopkins and Wallerstein; Smel-ser, a, b; Przeworski and Teune). Consideration of non-systemic explanations stressing historically contingent factors is thus permanently postponed because it is thought to constitute an undesirable solution to an analytical problem concerning levels of generalization. 10
Variable-Based and Case-Based Comparative Strategies
Taken together, these features of Durkheim's comparative strategy direct attention away from observational units of analysis to testing propositions about general patterns of relationships among abstract variables. There is a sharp polarization between the subject of research, relationships among variables, and objects of research, the observational units (Ragin, a).11 It is this disjunction that accounts for the observation that comparativists in sociology are often unfamiliar with the populations constituting their data bases.
However, this disjunction between subjects and objects of research is not a problem in view of the theoretical interests of Durkheim's comparative strategy. A variable-based strategy seeks transhistorical generalizations, not concrete knowledge about specific cases. This does not, however, make it a preferred strategy apart from its theoretical interest in permanent causes. Such a preference overlooks reservations about highly abstract generalizations by sociologists who prefer historically-grounded generalizations (see Bendix, a; Bendix and Roth; Zaret, a, b). A result of this oversight is the false dichotomy between variable-based comparisons and case studies (see Ragin, c). 12 Advantages of the former are revealed by contrasting them with putative deficiencies of the latter. Grimshaw remarks that the "comparativist is not concerned with the mechanics of bureaucracy in the particular case but rather with the interaction of variables such as autonomy, accountability, authority, and responsiblity over a large number of cases" (19-20; see also Smelser, b; Teune). Yet implied deficiencies of case-based research, that it is neither comparative nor conducive to empirical generalization, are certainly not to be found in Weber's work, which we argue is a casebased strategy of research. Weber's case-based strategy of comparison produces explanation and generalization, but unlike Durkheim's variablebased strategy, explanation is genetic, not functional, and generalizations are historically concrete, not abstractly ahistorical.
Historical Comparison and Ideal Types
Weber's comparative strategy is well-suited to issues that cannot be addressed adequately by statistical comparative strategies: questions about historical diversity. Weber's preference for genetic rather than functional explanation stems from his interest in the causes and consequences of this diversity (e, 15). His methods concern concrete cases. This is what distinguishes them most clearly from Durkheim's comparative strategy.
With the latter, researchers test for patterns of relations among abstract variables. This relegates Weber's concerns for diversity to a posteriori speculation about deviations from normal species patterns. While Durkheim's comparative strategy seeks generalizations by separating data and history, Weber's strategy turns to history for modest generalizations about historical diversity. Turning to history implies a case-based rather than a variable-based strategy, but, let us repeat, it does not imply renunciation of explanation and generalization. Rather, it leads to a different type of explanation and different degrees of generalization.
An interest in concrete cases is evident in virtually every aspect of Weberian comparisons. While practitioners of Durkheim's strategy begin research by defining a subject of research (i.e., relevant variables and their relationships) and then turn to a sample of observational units, a Weberian starts with an interest in specific historical processes and structures. Central to this strategy is use of ideal types to identify causes of diversity among historical processes and structures.
Ideal types are used to accomplish several related tasks: they aid conceptualization of research subjects; they help in the identification and assessment of adequate causes, and they provide a basis for explanations of historical diversity. In Weberian research, virtually every concept is conceived ideal typically, whether the concept is used in a taxonomic or more strictly explanatory manner.
Using ideal types to conceptualize research subjects presents an alternative to Durkheim's realist treatment of units of analysis, which regards them as natural systems. Weber regards units as hypothetical constructs and accordingly conceives them as ideal types. In this nominalist view (b, 439), the ultimate unit is meaningful action. That only the individual can be a carrier of meaningful action does not mean that individuals are the only possible research subject (see Roth, b, 120). Rather, it indicates that collective concepts-such as those in Economy and Society-must be carefully defined with ultimate reference to socially mediated meanings. Weber's nominalism, then, requires that research subjects be defined with utmost care and precision. Ideal types are especially well-suited to this task because they present an exaggerated version of reality and accentuate theoretically relevant features of it.
Throughout his work, Weber associates ideal types not only with terminological clarification but also with the formation of hypotheses (c, 189; d, 107, 123; e, 21; but see Bruun). Ideal types are models that are selectively developed as aids to genetic explanation. Structural properties of ideal types are often closely related to specific genetic issues. Capitalism as a model and rationalization are inseparable, as are ethical religion and rationalization, and charisma as a model and its routinization as a historical process. Because of this Weber calls ideal types "genetic concepts" (a, 93, 106). Their one-sided accentuation of significant features of research subjects clarifies hypotheses about the causes of historical diversity.
The genetic character of ideal types is thus inseparable from their one-sidedness. For example, Weber notes that one can formulate the concepts of Church and sect genetically or statistically. However, in formulating "the concept of 'sect' genetically, e.g., with reference to certain important cultural significances which the 'sectarian spirit' has had for modern culture, certain characteristics of both [Church and sect] become essential because they stand in an adequate causal relationship to those influences" (a, 93).
Ideal Types and Genetic Explanation
According to Nagel, genetic explanations show "why it is that a given subject of study has certain characteristics, by describing how the subject has evolved out of some earlier one." Such explanations contain "singular statements about past events"; "those events which are mentioned are This distinction has important implications for comparative methods. In permanent cause arguments, causes and effects are linked in a continuous manner. Variation in one produces variation in the other. Genetic arguments, in contrast, are characteristically combinatorial; specific conditions combine to produce a specific historical outcome. In genetic arguments, simultaneous satisfaction of a set of preconditions is necessary for subsequent historical outcomes.
Methods for evaluating genetic arguments differ from those used to test permanent cause arguments. As we noted above, the latter entail use Anderson does not discuss methodological issues, apart from historiographic ones. But his commitment to substantive Marxist views does not lessen the thoroughly Weberian format of his work. This is evident at the end of his study where he concludes that the significance of feudalism "bom of conflict and synthesis between two anterior modes of production, was thus the extreme differentiation and internal ramification of its cultural and political universe. In any comparative perspective this was not the least important of the peculiarities of the continent" (b, 412). Anderson's study provides an exemplary instance of Weberian comparison, stressing as it does a combinatorial analysis of the origins of historical divergence.
Combining Durkheimian and Weberian Strategies
Previous discussions (e.g., Smelser, b) of Durkheim's and Weber's strategies of comparison emphasize their convergence, not in their theoretical assumptions but in their actual research. Areas of practical convergence may exist, but this consists of combining the two strategies, not conflating them. The strategies that we outline as Durkheimian and Weberian use different logics of analysis to produce different forms of explanation in achieving their respective theoretical goals-for the Durkheimian, the goal of broad generalizations about systemic relations; for the Weberian, the goal of historically contextualized knowledge of the origins and consequences of historical diversity. These goals are irreducible.
However, it is neither necessary nor desirable to segregate comparative research along Durkheimian and Weberian lines. Differences between the two strategies are as complementary as they are irreducible. Not only does each strategy solve problems left unresolved by the other; each can positively aid the other, as can be seen in our following suggestions. These suggestions bring the unique features of historical and statistical certainty to bear respectively on Durkheimian and Weberian strategies of comparison. As an auxiliary to qualitative historical comparisons, the Durkheimian strategy seems strongest as a preliminary to analysis, as an aid in forming ideal types. As an auxiliary to statistical comparisons, the Weberian strategy can be a useful preliminary, aiding rigorous definition and construction of populations, and a necessary conclusion, explicating causal mechanisms responsible for observed correlations.
There are several ways in which statistical comparisons can contribute to the Weberian strategy. A well-known criticism of ideal types is that they are imaginary constructs. Based on thought experiments and only indirectly connected to empirical events, they can impede rather than facilitate comparative research. Statistical comparisons can prevent too wide a gulf from developing between ideal types and empirical events.
For statistical comparisons to do this, it is necessary to distinguish between historical models and secular theories in ideal types (see Roth, b) . Structural features of many ideal types can be isolated from genetic issues, and these features can be reconceptualized as variables and subjected to correlational analysis. Obviously, ideal types can neither be formulated nor verified in this manner. They are nominal concepts whose validity rests on their utility in historical comparisons. But this procedure does allow investigators to check the empirical plausibility of the ideal type's accentuation of reality.
A second use of correlational methods in Weberian research concerns the construction of ideal types. Above we noted that correlational methods are suited to this task. Statistical uniformities revealed by these methods can be incorporated in ideal types as rules of experience (Weber, a) that meet the criteria of objective possibility. Careful use of transhistorical propositions in formulating ideal types increases their heuristic value as middle-range concepts for comparative research.
It is also possible to strengthen statistical strategies of comparison with qualitative historical comparisons. One way concerns the definition and selection of units of observation. Durkheim's use of species is clearly unsatisfactory. This has left a vacuum which is filled with implicit historical judgments (e.g., using a sample of all known societies or some vaguely defined subset). Qualitative historical comparisons provide a better remedy. Theoretical arguments about the research subject can be used to construct an ideal type of the observational unit. Comparisons of observations with this ideal type could be used to establish membership criteria, and the relevant population of units can then be specified. Cross-societal correlations consequently would emerge from rigorously constructed populations of comparable units.
Qualitative historical comparisons can also resolve well-known problems of the relationship between correlation and causation. Causal mechanisms are not visible in correlations; they are specified in theories. Researchers who assert that a correlation illustrates a particular causal process can be contradicted by others who argue that different causal mechanisms are at work. Weberian comparisons can help solve this problem because genetic arguments produced by qualitative historical research pinpoint precise causal sequences. A good example of this is Paige's study of agrarian revolution which uses qualitative analysis to explicate causal sequences implied in correlational analyses of world patterns.
Conclusions
Methodological procedures, no matter how narrowly construed, follow priorities laid down by theoretical interests and commitments. These commitments are substantive and epistemological in nature. In the comparative strategies of Durkheim and Weber, there is an explicit relation of logical adequacy among methodological stricture, substantive interest, and epistemological commitment. Both advocate and use comparative methods that are consistent with their substantive conceptions of order and change, and with epistemological conceptions of social scientific knowledge. Durkheim grounds his comparative strategy in a substantive view of society as a system and in a positivist vision of a natural science of society. Weber's comparative methodology emerges from his preoccupation with the origins of historical diversity and a neo-Kantian philosophy of science.
Durkheim's theoretical commitments led him to notions about emergence, a realist conception of units as systems, analysis of systemic causes using correlational methods, and functional forms of explanation. Weber's theoretical commitments led instead to a heuristic conception of units that rules out notions of emergence, to analysis of historical causes using qualitative historical methods, and to genetic forms of explanation. The choice, as Weber saw it (a, 102-3, 106) , was either to develop limited theoretical constructs that could be used to interpret historical phenomena or to create ambitious, comprehensive theories that use history for illustrative purposes. For Durkheim, historical diversity was a hindrance. His strictures (d, 117-8) against genetic explanation have no counterpart in Weber's thought precisely because of Weber's interest in understanding the causes and consequences of historical diversity.
Of course, for many contemporary sociologists, goals of Weberian comparison seem less desirable than those of Durkheim's comparative strategy. In part, this is because Durkheim, unlike Weber, promises to provide cumulative knowledge in a discipline prone to excessive concern about its status as normal science. The historically grounded character of Weberian explanations makes them far more limited in application than the transhistorical generalizations of Durkheimian sociology.
It is for this reason that arguments about a methodological convergence of Durkheim and Weber, of statistical and qualitative-historical strategies of comparison, may seem attractive. But such arguments obscure the problem of choosing and combining appropriate research strategies, and they blur methodological and theoretical features of different strategies. The problem of choosing appropriate strategies can be avoided by caricaturing these differences, equating them with a choice between science and non-science, sociology and history, explanation and description. Yet none of these distinctions applies to the variable-based and case-based strategies developed respectively by Durkheim and Weber.
Is there a middle ground between their positions that might contain a resolution of their methodological differences? We think not. The two strategies are neither congruent nor convergent with regard to units of analysis, conceptions of causality and adequate explanation, or logic of analysis. But different aspects of the two comparative strategies can be combined in complementary ways to improve the quality of comparative work. This, however, presupposes due appreciation of the unique strengths of each strategy. 10. This leads to a denial of history in the sense that the past can be seen as a cause of the present. Seldom is this stated explicitly in discussions on eliminating contextual efects by higher levels of generalization. An exception is Czudnowski: "the so-called 'impact of the past' is to a large extent a cultural reinforcement of attitudes determined by persisting social, economic, or ecological restraints" (24-5). For trenchant criticisms of this position see Geilner. 11. This lies at the core of critical comments on comparative studies of mobility by Eisenstadt and also Sharlin. Sharlin complains that "mobility has been set off by itself as an object of study" and that "the study of mobility has ironically been isolated from the study of society" (339-40). 12. We agree with Stinchcombe's remark that "the dilemma between synthetic reasoned generalizations, tested against the facts, and historical uniqueness, a portrait of the facts, is a false dilemma" (115-6). However, Weber's comparative strategy is different from Stinchcombe's prescription for this dilemma: establishing deep analogies among facts in view of larger theoretical issues. 13. What did not make sense to Weber is today, in slightly altered form, a dominant style of theoretical reflection in sociology, axiomatic ordering of formalized propositions that have been counterfactually tested by correlational analysis of data. 
